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ABSTRACT
In randomized field experiments, we embedded one- to two-sentence anchoring, goal-setting, or savings
threshold cues in emails to employees about their 401(k) savings plan. We find that anchors increase
or decrease 401(k) contribution rates by up to 1.9% of income. A high savings goal example raises
contribution rates by up to 2.2% of income. Highlighting a higher savings threshold in the match incentive
structure raises contributions by up to 1.5% of income relative to highlighting the lower threshold.
Highlighting the maximum possible contribution rate raises contribution rates by up to 2.9% of income
among low savers.
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In this paper, we analyze field experiments where we randomly assigned employees at a 
large U.S. technology company to receive one of several versions of an email. Control emails 
reminded recipients of the employer matching contributions in their 401(k) retirement savings 
plan and how much the recipient had contributed so far in the calendar year. Treatment emails 
were identical to the control emails, except that they also included one of nine different one- to 
two-sentence  cues.  The  cues  were  designed  to  trigger  psychological  phenomena  previously 
documented in the psychology and behavioral economics literature. Specifically, we sought to 
use  anchoring,  goal  setting,  and  savings-threshold  salience  to  influence  the  recipient’s 
subsequent savings choices. Across multiple independent experiments, we find that these small 
cues have large effects. High numerical cues raise 401(k) contribution rates, and low numerical 
cues depress 401(k) contribution rates. 
The first cues we analyze are “anchors,” or arbitrary numerical cues. Psychologists have 
long known that the presentation of anchors can shift subjects’ judgments, willingness to pay for 
goods,  and  hypothetical  credit  card  payment  decisions  towards  those  anchors  in  laboratory 
experiments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Johnson and Schkade, 1989; Green et al., 1998; 
Kahneman  and  Knetsch,  1993;  Ariely,  Loewenstein,  and  Prelec,  2003;  Stewart,  2009).
1 
However, evidence is only beginning to emerge on the importance of anchoring for economic 
decisions outside the laboratory (Baker, Pan, and Wurgler, forthcoming; Beggs and Graddy, 
2009; Dougal et al., 2010). Our anchoring cues are one-sentence examples of 401(k) contribution 
rate increases that are explicitly described as containing no informational content. Anchoring 
should cause employees who receive the high contribution rate increase examples to contribute 
more than employees who receive the low contribution rate increase examples. 
The next cues we test are two-sentence savings goal examples. Locke and Latham (1990, 
2002, 2006) summarize a large literature showing that setting concrete goals that are difficult to 
achieve enhances performance relative to setting unambitious or vague “do your best” goals. A 
number  of  laboratory  studies  have  found  that  behavior  changes  even  when  the  goals  are 
subconsciously primed by environmental cues rather than consciously chosen (Chartrand and 
Bargh, 1996; Bargh et al., 2001; Stajkovic, Locke, and Blair, 2006). Our goal treatments lie 
                                                 
1 Anchoring has traditionally been understood to arise from people beginning their thought process at the arbitrary 
anchor value and incompletely adjusting away from that starting point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Epley and 
Gilovich, 2001). Other researchers have argued that anchoring occurs because information that is consistent with the 
anchor becomes more cognitively accessible (Mussweiler and Strack, 1999, 2001; Chapman and Johnson, 2002; 
Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). 2 
between the interventions summarized by Locke and Latham, which explicitly impose goals on 
subjects, and the interventions that subconsciously prime goals. Although email recipients can 
fully perceive the goal being cued, the cues do not overtly urge them to adopt a goal. A $7,000 or 
an  $11,000  savings  goal  is  presented  as  a  mere  example  used  to  illustrate  the  matching 
contribution structure. The goals literature predicts that the $11,000 savings goal example will 
result in higher savings rates than the $7,000 savings goal example. 
Our last set of cues highlights certain savings thresholds within the 401(k). Choi et al. 
(2002) and Benartzi and Thaler (2007) argue that many people simplify the problem of choosing 
a 401(k) contribution rate by using rules of thumb tied to salient savings thresholds created by 
the  plan’s  structure,  such  as  “contribute  the  maximum  possible  amount,”  or  “contribute  the 
minimum  necessary  to  earn  the  maximum  possible  employer  matching  contributions.”  Our 
threshold cues make salient either the maximum possible contribution rate (60% of income), the 
annual contribution amount necessary to earn the maximum employer match ($16,500), or the 
annual contribution amount after which the highest marginal matching incentives stop ($3,000). 
Making a certain threshold salient may make an employee more likely to use it as guidance in 
choosing her contribution rate; a high salient threshold would increase contributions more than a 
low salient threshold. 
We find that in the short run, a low anchor decreases average contribution rates relative to 
a control email that contains no intentional anchoring cues, but high anchors have no effect on 
average  contribution  rates.  The  effect  of  a  1%  anchor  (the  lowest  anchor  we  test)  initially 
becomes more negative over time, achieving its largest magnitude three months after the email, 
when it depresses contribution rates by 1.4% of income.
 This effect disappears four months after 
the email in the pay period when the annual bonus is paid. The 3%, 10%, and 20% anchors do 
not change average contribution rates at the 5% significance level for the first five months after 
the email, but they reduce the probability of recipients making a contribution change. In the 
longer run—up to a year after the email—both low and high anchors affect average contribution 
rates. The 1% anchor decreases contribution rates by up to 1.2% of income, the 3% anchor 
increases contribution rates by up to 1.5% of income, the 10% anchor increases contribution 
rates by up to 1.9% of income, and the 20% anchor increases contribution rates by up to 1.4% of 
income. 
We also find that the $11,000 savings goal example raises contribution rates more than 3 
the $7,000 savings goal example. The $11,000 goal’s impact is at its apex two months after the 
emails were sent, raising contribution rates by 2.2% of income relative to the control email. The 
$7,000 goal example essentially has no impact on contribution rates relative to the control email. 
The fact that the high goal raises savings rates in the short run whereas the high anchors do not 
suggests that the high-goal effect is not merely a manifestation of an anchoring effect. 
Lastly, we find that highlighting high savings thresholds raises contributions relative to 
highlighting low savings thresholds.  Making  the  $16,500  savings  threshold  salient  initially 
results in average contribution rates similar to making the $3,000 savings threshold salient. But 
four months after the email, recipients of the $3,000 threshold treatment are contributing 1.5% of 
income  less  than  recipients  of  the  $16,500  threshold  treatment.  Mentioning  that  60%  is  the 
maximum possible contribution rate generates an even larger effect immediately after the email, 
but only for those who were previously contributing little. Among those on pace before the email 
to contribute no more than $2,500 for the calendar year, receiving the 60% threshold treatment 
increases contribution rates by 2.9% of income more than the control group one month after the 
email.  Those  on  pace  to  contribute  more  than  $2,500  are  unaffected  by  the  60%  threshold 
treatment  on  average.  Further  analysis  suggests  that  low  contribution  rates  (as  a  percent  of 
income) at the time of the email, rather than low contribution dollar amounts, predicts high 
responsiveness to the 60% threshold treatment. Again, we find that the pattern of these threshold 
effects differs from that of the anchoring effects, suggesting that some independent mechanism 
lies behind them. 
Because many email recipients likely ignored our emails or did not read them carefully 
enough to notice the cues, our estimated effect sizes are closer to zero than the true effects of 
seeing  the  cues.  Nevertheless,  our  estimates  are  large  compared  to  those  estimated  for  a 
conventional economic lever, employer matching contributions to a 401(k). Kusko, Poterba, and 
Wilcox (1998) find, at one manufacturing firm, that increasing the match rate from 25% to 150% 
on the first 6% of income contributed raised average 401(k) contribution rates by only 0.2% to 
0.3% of income. A decrease in the match rate from 139% to 0% was accompanied by an average 
contribution rate fall of only 0.3% of income. Another company studied by Choi et al. (2002) 
went from matching 50% of the first 5% of income contributed to matching 50% of the first 7% 
of income contributed for union employees, and from matching 50% of the first 6% of income 
contributed to matching 50% of the first 8% of income contributed for management employees. 4 
The increase in the average contribution rate from three months prior to the change to six months 
after the change is 0.4% of income.
2 
Due to the constraints of our field setting, we cannot establish beyond all doubt that the 
psychological  mechanisms  that  motivated  our  cues  are  in  fact  responsible  for  our  treatment 
effects. Our cues are therefore akin to automatic enrollment in retirement savings plans (Madrian 
and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2002, 2004; Beshears et al., 2008), which has large effects on 
savings outcomes but whose exact psychological mechanisms are not yet precisely identified 
(candidates include procrastination, status quo bias, simplicity seeking, endorsement effects, and 
anchoring).  In  particular,  we  cannot  completely  exclude  the  possibility  that  our  cues  were 
effective because employees interpreted the cues as containing relevant information about their 
optimal savings choices.
3 For inference from subtle email cues to drive the treatment effects, 
employees at this firm must have extremely diffuse prior beliefs about how much they should be 
saving  in  their  401(k).  Our  paper’s  central  message  is  that,  irrespective  of  the  exact 
psychological channels through which they operate, small cues of the types we have tested have 
large effects on savings choices. Organizations and policymakers should be cognizant of these 
facts when designing their communications. 
Our  findings  are  related  to  other  research  that  has  found  that  individuals’  savings 
outcomes are strongly influenced by small changes in their decision-making environment. Many 
people  are  financially  passive,  so  changes  in  the  default  401(k)  contribution  rate  and  asset 
allocation change the contribution rates and asset allocations they end up with (Madrian and 
Shea,  2001;  Choi  et  al.,  2002,  2004;  Beshears  et  al.,  2008).  Automatic  contribution  rate 
escalation causes many people’s contribution rates to increase in lockstep with the automatic 
escalation  schedule  (Thaler  and  Benartzi,  2004;  Benartzi,  Peleg,  and  Thaler,  forthcoming). 
Forcing people to stop being passive and actively make a savings choice before a deadline raises 
                                                 
2 This result is not reported in Choi et al. (2002), but is reported here for the first time using that paper’s data. The 
sample over which this average is calculated is restricted to those who had a positive contribution rate nine months 
prior to the match threshold change. Choi et al. (2002) show that the match threshold change had no effect on the 
probability of having a positive contribution rate. 
3 The most straightforward way to rule out the information channel would have been to show employees the number 
in the email being produced by a random number generator such as the wheel of fortune in Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), making the uninformative nature of the cue irrefutable. However, such a demonstration would be extremely 
unnatural within the context of a corporate communication, creating a high risk of Hawthorne effects. In fact, even 
many laboratory anchoring experiments do not show the anchors being randomly generated to the subjects (e.g., 
Chapman and Johnson, 1994, 1999; Epley and Gilovich, 2001; Green et al., 1998; Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995; 
Mussweiler and Strack, 2001; Stewart, 2009; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Wegener et al., 2001). 5 
contribution rates relative to a regime in which the default contribution rate is zero and there is 
no  active  decision  deadline  (Carroll  et  al.,  2009).  Simplifying  the  menu  of  401(k)  options 
decreases the stickiness of the default by reducing the cognitive cost of opting out (Huberman, 
Iyengar, and Jiang, 2004; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009b; Beshears et al., 2010a). More 
investment  menu  complexity  causes  employees  to  allocate  more  of  their  portfolio  to  money 
market and bond funds (Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010). Unlike the above papers, we test the 
savings effects of interventions that subtly change the decision-making environment but do not 
rely upon passivity or the manipulation of action costs to affect behavior. Our results are thus 
more akin to Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009a), who find that making the employer match’s 
asset allocation less salient results in 401(k) participants ignoring it when choosing an asset 
allocation for their other 401(k) balances. 
Our paper is also related to non-experimental work in economics that identifies the effect 
of anchoring on decisions outside the laboratory. Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (forthcoming) show 
that the offer price for merger targets is biased towards the target stock’s trailing 52-week high, a 
highly salient but normatively irrelevant number. Beggs and Graddy (2009) conclude that sales 
prices of auctioned paintings are anchored on the painting’s previous sale price because the 
portion of the painting’s previous sale price that was due to aggregate art market conditions at 
the time influences the current sale price. Using a similar econometric methodology, Dougal et 
al. (2010) find that a firm’s borrowing cost is anchored on the nominal value of its historical 
borrowing costs.  
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the relevant features 
of  the  company  401(k)  plan.  Section  II  describes  the  experimental  design,  and  Section  III 
describes our data. Section IV presents our experimental results. Section V concludes. 
 
I. 401(k) plan features 
  Employees  at  the  company  we  study  can  make  before-tax,  after-tax,  or  Roth
4 
contributions to their 401(k) plan. Before March 2011, employees specified three percentages: 
the percent of their paycheck they wanted to contribute on a before-tax, after-tax, and Roth basis. 
Starting in March 2011, employees had the option of specifying a dollar amount rather than a 
                                                 
4 Roth contributions are made using after-tax dollars. At retirement, both principal and capital gains are not taxed 
upon withdrawal. 6 
percentage to contribute from each paycheck to each contribution category. The sum of the 
contributions could not exceed 60% of income during any two-week pay period in 2009 and 
2010. In 2011, employees could contribute 100% of their paycheck to the 401(k). Throughout 
our sample period, total before-tax plus Roth contributions during a calendar year were capped at 
$16,500 for employees under the age of 50, and at $22,000 for employees age 50 and over. Total 
401(k) contributions including after-tax and employer matching contributions were limited to 
$49,000 in a calendar year.  
  Starting in 2007, new hires and employees who had never enrolled in the 401(k) were 
automatically  enrolled  at  a  3%  before-tax  contribution  rate  unless  they  opted  out.  At  the 
beginning  of  each  subsequent  calendar  year  until  2010,  employees  who  had  never  actively 
chosen their 401(k) elections had their before-tax contribution rate automatically increased by 1 
percentage point, and the default before-tax contribution rate for new hires also increased by 1 
percentage  point.  In  2011,  the  default  contribution  rate  for  new  hires  did  not  change,  and 
seasoned employees were not subject to automatic contribution rate increases. 
  The company makes contributions to the 401(k) that depend upon each employee’s own 
cumulative  contributions  during  the  calendar  year.  The  match  amount  during  2009  was  the 
greater of (1) 100% of before-tax plus Roth contributions up to $2,500, or (2) 50% of before-tax 
plus Roth contributions up to $16,500, resulting in a maximum possible match of $8,250. This 
match structure generates a 100% marginal subsidy on contributions up to $2,500, a 0% marginal 
subsidy  on  contributions  between  $2,501  and  $5,000,  and  a  50%  marginal  subsidy  on 
contributions  between  $5,001  and  $16,500.  In  2010,  the  match  structure  changed  to  be  the 
greater of (1) 100% of before-tax plus Roth contributions up to $3,000, or (2) 50% of before-tax 
plus Roth contributions up to $16,500. This new match structure shifts the 0% marginal match 
zone to contributions between $3,001 and $6,000. Matching contributions vest immediately. 
Employees receive an annual bonus that is paid each March. In 2009 and 2010, if an 
employee had a 5% contribution rate in effect during the pay period in which the bonus is paid, 
5% of the bonus would be contributed to the 401(k) plan. As a result, many employees changed 
their contribution rate shortly before or during the bonus pay period in 2009 and 2010. Starting 
in  2011,  employees  could  choose  a  separate  contribution  election  for  their  bonus,  and  this 
election could specify dollar amounts to be contributed rather than percentages of the bonus. 
Unless actively changed by the employee, the bonus contribution election was by default set 7 
equal to the election for regular paychecks. Bonuses were paid on March 6, 2009, March 5, 
2010, and March 11, 2011. Unlike in prior years, the 2011 bonus payment date did not coincide 
with a regular payday. 
 
II. Experimental design 
On November 17, 2009, we sent emails to employees who would contribute less than 
$16,500 on a before-tax plus Roth basis in 2009 if they left their contribution rate elections as of 
November  4,  2009  unchanged.  We  sent  a  second  round  of  emails  almost  a  year  later  to 
employees who were on pace to contribute less than $16,500 on a before-tax plus Roth basis in 
2010 if they left their contribution elections as of October 15, 2010 unchanged.
5 Most of this 
second round was sent on October 19, 2010, but a randomized subset of employees received 
their email on October 28, 2010 instead. The 2010 study was intended as a conceptual replication 
and extension of the 2009 study. We present the results concurrently below for efficiency. 
We  randomized  which  email  version  each  employee  received.  Figure  1  shows  the 
template used for the 2009 emails. All 2009 emails described the matching contributions the 
company offered and the amount the recipient had contributed so far in 2009. Following this 
information was the statement, “To take greater advantage of [Company]’s 2009 match, increase 
your  contribution  rate  for  the  remaining  six  weeks  of  2009.”  The  emails  concluded  with 
information on how to change one’s contribution rate on the Vanguard website and was signed 
by the company’s benefits director. The 2010 email template was identical, except that the match 
information  was  updated  to  reflect  the  new  match  structure,  the  year-to-date  contribution 
information reflected 2010 contributions, and the statement about increasing one’s contribution 
rate was replaced by, “To take greater advantage of [Company]’s 2010 match, increase your 
contribution rate soon before the year is over.” 
Within each year, the only difference between the control and treatment emails was that 
the treatment emails included one or two additional sentences right after the statement about 
taking greater advantage of the match (the location indicated by the “Treatment text was inserted 
here” box in Figure 1). Table 1 shows the additional sentences in each treatment email. We will 
                                                 
5 We excluded from the first email campaign employees who had been hired in 2009, since they may have made 
contributions to a previous employer’s 401(k) in 2009 (which are unobserved by us) and thus not be eligible to 
contribute $16,500 on a before-tax plus Roth basis to their current company’s 401(k) in 2009. For the same reason, 
we excluded employees who had been hired in 2010 from the second email campaign. 8 
discuss the treatments and randomization scheme in the below subsections. 
 
A. Anchoring treatments 
Employees in the 1% anchor treatment received the additional sentences, “For example, 
you could increase your contribution rate by 1% of your income and get more of the match 
money for which you’re eligible. (1% is just an example, and shouldn’t be interpreted as advice 
on what the right contribution increase is for you.)” Employees in the 3%, 10%, or 20% anchor 
treatments were shown analogous text, but 3%, 10%, or 20% replaced the two instances of 1%. 
The  explicit  denial  that  the  treatment  text  contained  any  information  about  the  recipient’s 
optimal 401(k) contribution rate was designed to make this treatment as close as possible to an 
arbitrary numerical anchor within a framework appropriate to a corporate communication.  
 
B. Savings-goal treatments 
The savings-goal treatments made salient a savings goal that was higher than what the 
employee would save if his or her current 401(k) contribution rate were left unchanged. The 
$7,000 savings goal treatment consisted of two additional sentences added to the control email: 
“For example, suppose you set a goal to contribute $7,000 for the year and you attained it. You 
would earn $500 more in matching money this year than you’re currently on pace for.” The 
$11,000 savings goal treatment instead contained the sentences, “For example, suppose you set a 
goal to contribute $11,000 for the year and you attained it. You would earn $2,500 more in 
matching money this year than you’re currently on pace for.” The assignment scheme we will 
describe in Section II.D ensured that everybody in a goal treatment would receive the same 
additional match ($500 or $2,500) for attaining a $7,000 or $11,000 savings level in the 401(k). 
   
C. Threshold-salience treatments 
The three threshold-salience treatments emphasized a savings level or choice that was 
higher  than  the  employee’s  status  quo.  The  $3,000  threshold  treatment  email  included  the 
sentence,  “The  next  $x  of  contributions  you  make  between  now  and  December  31  will  be 
matched at a 100% rate,” where x was the difference between $3,000 and the employee’s year-
to-date  before-tax  plus  Roth  contributions.  The  $16,500  threshold  treatment  email  instead 
included the sentence, “Contributing $y more between now and December 31 would earn you the 9 
maximum possible match,” where y was the difference between $16,500 and the employee’s 
year-to-date before-tax plus Roth contributions. Employees in the 60% threshold treatment had 
the following sentence added to their email: “You can contribute up to 60% of your income in 
any pay period.” 
 
D. Randomization scheme 
Table 2 shows how the 4,723 email recipients in 2009 and the 4,307 email recipients in 
2010  whom  we  analyze  in  this  paper  were  allocated  across  experimental  conditions.
6 
Assignments to conditions in 2010 were independent of assignments in 2009. 
Employees  naturally  fell  into  three  categories  based  on  their  marginal  incentives  to 
increase their before-tax and Roth contributions in the calendar year above what they would 
contribute  if  they  left  their  contribution  rate  elections  unchanged:  those  who  faced  a  100% 
marginal match on those additional contributions, those who faced a 0% marginal match, and 
those who faced a 50% marginal match. Eligibility for assignment to experimental conditions 
depended on which category the employee was in. Within each year, employees had an equal 
probability of being assigned to each of the conditions for which they were eligible. 
In 2009, most employees who were on pace to contribute at least $5,000—and thus faced 
a 50% marginal match—could be assigned to the control, the 1% anchor treatment, or the 60% 
threshold treatment. We do not analyze employees in this projected contribution category who 
were not eligible for all three treatments (and they do not appear in Table 2). Employees were 
eligible for all three treatments if increasing their before-tax plus Roth contribution rate by 1% of 
income for the remainder of 2009 would not cause their 2009 before-tax plus Roth contributions 
to exceed $16,500.  
The  anchoring  statement’s  implication  that  increasing  one’s  contribution  rate  by  the 
anchor amount would increase the match earned was not necessarily true for employees whose 
                                                 
6 Previous drafts of this paper also reported results from a 10% anchor treatment administered in 2009. The effects 
of this earlier 10% anchor treatment on average contribution rates are consistent with those of the 10% anchor 
treatment administered in 2010, but we exclude the earlier treatment from the current paper because we discovered 
that by chance, randomization had created a significant difference in the average pre-email contribution rate of the 
2009  10%  anchor  recipients  relative  to  their  corresponding  control  group.  There  are  also  a  small  number  of 
employees assigned to a treatment who are not in our analysis (and also excluded from Table 2) because they left the 
company before the first payday after the emails were sent, they had temporary Social Security numbers that made 
matching their 401(k) transactions to subsequent Vanguard records indexed by permanent Social Security numbers 
difficult, or because their employment termination date was ambiguous in the data. These exclusions cause minor 
imbalances in the number of employees in each cell. 10 
marginal match on the next dollar of contribution increase was zero. And the implication could 
be somewhat misleading for employees whose marginal match on the next dollar of contribution 
increase was 100%, because much of the increase beyond the next dollar could be in the region 
where the marginal match was 0%. This is why we did not administer the 1% anchor to any 
employee on pace to contribute less than $5,000 in 2009. These employees had an equal chance 
of receiving only the control email or the 60% threshold email. 
In 2010, most employees who were on pace to make at least $6,000 in before-tax plus 
Roth contributions—and thus faced a 50% marginal match—could be assigned to the control, the 
delayed control, the 3% anchor, the 10% anchor, or the 20% anchor. Employees in the delayed 
control condition received the control email on October 28 instead of October 19. We do not 
analyze employees in this category who were not eligible to be assigned to all five of these 
treatments—anybody whose before-tax plus Roth contributions in 2010 would exceed $16,500 if 
he or she increased his or her before-tax plus Roth contribution rate by 20% of income for just 
one pay period. 
Employees on pace to contribute between $3,000 and $5,999 on a before-tax plus Roth 
basis in 2010 had an equal chance of receiving the control email, the delayed control email, the 
$7,000 savings goal example, or the $11,000 savings goal example. Because the marginal match 
on  before-tax  plus  Roth  contributions  between  $3,001  and  $6,000  was  0%,  each  of  these 
employees would earn exactly $500 or $2,500 more in matching money by raising their total 
2010 before-tax plus Roth contributions to $7,000 or $11,000, respectively. 
 Employees who were on pace to contribute less than $3,000 on a before-tax plus Roth 
basis  in  2010—and  thus  faced  a  100%  marginal  match—were  equally  likely  to  receive  the 
$3,000 threshold treatment or the $16,500 threshold treatment. Because there were not many 
employees on pace to contribute less than $3,000 in 2010, we did not assign anybody in this 
projected contribution category to the control group. Therefore, our analysis of these treatments 
will just compare the $3,000 threshold treatment effect to the $16,500 threshold treatment effect. 
Untabulated randomization checks reveal that pre-email contribution rates and salaries do 
not  differ  significantly  between  any  treatment  group  and  its  corresponding  control  group  or 
between the $3,000 and $16,500 threshold treatment groups. 
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III. Data description 
  We use salary and employment termination date data from personnel records and 401(k) 
data provided to the company by Vanguard. Vanguard data include cross-sectional snapshots of 
all 401(k) contribution rate elections (before-tax, after-tax, and Roth) in effect among email 
recipients on January 3, 2008, November 4, 2009, October 15, 2010, and every month-end from 
January 2010 to August 2011. We also have a record of every 401(k) contribution rate change 
among this population from January 3, 2008 to August 31, 2011. Individuals in the data were 
assigned random identifiers; no personally identifying information was included.  
We use the contribution rate data to construct a panel of 401(k) contribution rates in 
effect at the end of each two-week pay period.
7 Contribution rate changes submitted fewer than 
ten days before the next payday do not take effect until the second payday after the change, so 
our data allow us to identify contribution rates in effect up to the September 2, 2011 payday.  
  On the last payday before the 2009 email was sent, the average total contribution rate 
(before-tax plus after-tax plus Roth)
8 as a fraction of income was 3.6% among email recipients 
on  pace  to  contribute  less  than  $2,500  in  2009,  5.5%  among  email  recipients  on  pace  to 
contribute between $2,501 and $5,000 in 2009, and 11.0% among email recipients on pace to 
contribute more than $5,000 in 2009. On the last payday before the bulk of the 2010 emails was 
sent, the average total contribution rate was 3.4% among email recipients on pace to contribute 
less than $3,000 in 2010, 6.1% among email recipients on pace to contribute between $3,001 and 
$6,000 in 2010, and 9.6% among email recipients on pace to contribute more than $6,000 in 
2010. 
 
IV. Experimental results 
A. Effect of getting a control email versus getting no email 
  Does simply getting a reminder email about the 401(k), without additional cues, affect 
                                                 
7 If multiple contribution rate change transactions are recorded with the same effective date, we assign the latest 
contribution rate chosen before a payday to be the one that was effective on that payday. Up to February 19, 2010, 
we have both the date and time each change transaction was entered. After February 19, 2010, we only have the date 
each change transaction was entered. Therefore, if somebody entered multiple contribution rate changes on the same 
day, we cannot directly identify which rate was the last one entered. We can usually infer what the last rate was from 
the month-end contribution rate snapshots. In the rare cases where we cannot, we use the average of the contribution 
rates entered on that day. 
8 We focus on the total contribution rate because it more closely maps to total asset accumulation, which is most 
relevant for welfare. 12 
savings choices? In this subsection, we assess the impact of getting a control email versus getting 
no email at all. Later, we will analyze how savings impact varied across email versions. 
Figure 2 shows the average total contribution rate at each payday through October 15, 
2010 for the subset of the 2009 control group (across all projected contribution categories) that 
was  employed  at  the  company  on  January  3,  2008.
9  The  impact  of  the  company’s  1% 
contribution auto-escalation is visible at the beginning of 2009, but it begins to be reversed 
immediately. By the beginning of March 2009, when the annual bonus was paid, the average 
total contribution rate is similar to what it was immediately prior to the auto-escalation. This 
strong reversal is surprising in light of the success the auto-escalation program studied by Thaler 
and Benartzi (2004) had at raising long-run 401(k) contribution rates. The lack of inertia at this 
company may be due to the bonus payment serving as a focal deadline for action. However, the 
magnitude of the reversal must be interpreted with caution, since only employees who were on 
pace to contribute less than $16,500 on a before-tax plus Roth basis in 2009 as of November 4, 
2009  were  sent  emails  (and  hence  included  in  the  graph’s  sample).  This  means  that  some 
employees who were on pace to hit the $16,500 maximum because they maintained or increased 
their contribution rates after the 2009 auto-escalation are excluded from the graph. 
  The impact of our 2009 control email appears to be large. The average total contribution 
rate  on  November  27,  2009—the  first  payday  following  the  email—of  control  recipients 
employed since January 2008 is 10.7%, which is 2.3% of income higher than it was two weeks 
earlier. Due to the ten-day lag between when a contribution rate change request is entered and 
when it becomes effective, the November 27 contribution rate only reflects changes that were 
made  in  response  to  the  November  17  email  on  the  same  day  the  email  was  sent.  Even 
contribution rates entered on November 18 would not be reflected until December 11. Indeed, 
the average total contribution rate increases further to 11.8% on December 11, 3.4 percentage 
points higher than it was on November 13. The average then falls slightly to 11.5% on December 
24. 
By comparison, during the last three pay periods of the prior year, the sample’s average 
total contribution rate falls by 0.5% of income. Alternatively, if we use as the counterfactual the 
0.1%  per-pay-period  average  contribution  rate  increase  in  the  eight  months  prior  to  the 
experiment (March 6, 2009 to November 13, 2009), then the average contribution rate would 
                                                 
9 Employees who leave the company are not included in the averages after their departure date. 13 
have increased by only 0.3% of income over the last three pay periods of 2009 in the absence of 
the control email. 
The 2010 auto-escalation raises the average contribution rate to 12.1% on January 8, 
2010, but the average falls quickly afterwards. On the March 5, 2010 bonus payday, the average 
contribution rate is 9.8%, and it falls precipitously to 8.5% on the next payday. Much of this 
post-bonus  fall  is  due  to  some  employees  hitting  the  annual  before-tax  plus  Roth  dollar 
contribution limit on March 5, which forces their before-tax and Roth contribution rates to be 
zero for the remainder of the year.
10 The average contribution rate then falls slowly afterwards 
through October 2010, when our second round of emails was sent. 
  In October 2010, we can use a contemporaneous randomized comparison to estimate the 
impact of the control email. Figure 3 plots the average total contribution rate each pay period 
minus the total contribution rate in effect on October 15, 2010—the last payday before the first 
2010 emails were sent—for the delayed control group and the subset of the control group that 
was eligible to be assigned to the delayed control. Figure 3 does not show the total contribution 
rate in effect for the employee’s 2011 bonus, as will be the case for all subsequent figures 
depicting the effects of the 2010 emails. 
The average total contribution rate of the control group (the thin black line) on October 
29 is 1.5% of income higher than it was on October 15, whereas the delayed control group’s 
average total contribution rate (the thick black line) rises by only 0.1% of income during the 
same period. The difference is significant at the 1% level (t = 4.94). Figure 3 subsequently 
shows, however, that the delayed control group makes up for lost time, contributing more than 
the control group on November 26 and December 10. Both groups end up contributing about the 
same total amount. Averaging across pay periods, we find that the average total contribution rate 
in  effect  from  October  29  to  December  23  is  2.4%  of  income  higher  than  the  October  15 
contribution rate for the control group and 2.1% of income higher for the delayed control group; 
the difference is not significant.
11 Over the longer horizon of October 29 to September 2 of the 
following year, the delayed control group has an insignificant 0.1% of income higher average 
contribution  rate  out  of  non-bonus  paydays  than  the  control  group.  The  delay  also  has  no 
                                                 
10 These employees’ contribution rates are automatically restored to their previous positive level at the beginning of 
the next year. A portion of the average contribution rate increase at the beginning of each year is due to such 
employees. 
11 In this and subsequent regressions where we average across paydays, we restrict the sample to employees who 
were still at the company at the end of the period we are averaging over. 14 
significant  effect  on  the  contribution  rate  chosen  for  the  bonus.  Because  we  do  not  have 
information on each employee’s bonus size, if an employee chose to contribute a certain dollar 
amount  out  of  his  bonus  (rather  than  a  percentage),  we  cannot  translate  that  choice  into  a 
percentage election. We therefore do not include employees who chose a dollar amount for their 
bonus contribution in any of our analyses of the 2011 bonus. Only 4.5% of employees across all 
the 2010 mailings chose a dollar amount for their bonus contribution, so the sample loss is small. 
We find that the delayed control group made contributions out of the bonus that were lower than 
the control group’s contributions by only 0.02% of the bonus amount. 
  Both campaigns generated positive comments from recipients. Many expressed generic 
thanks,  such  as:  “Kudos  and  thanks  to  the  benefits  team  for  this  very  helpful  and  timely 
reminder.” A few specifically mentioned the usefulness of the information included in the email, 
suggesting that a sizable fraction of employees have only a noisy sense of how much they are 
saving and the company match structure. For example, one employee noted, “I had no idea I was 
putting so little away!” Another said, “I had thought my % was high enough to take advantage of 
all of [Company]’s 401k matching but hadn’t had time to double check. This e-mail is one of the 
examples of why I like working at [Company].” 
  Collectively, these results indicate that reminding employees about their 401(k) match, 
informing them of their year-to-date contribution amount, and making salient the year-end date 
had a large effect on contribution behavior.
12 However, small changes in the timing of the email 
relative  to  the  salient  reference  date  did  not  matter  for  total  accumulation,  as  employees 
responded more strongly the closer the email was to the reference date. 
 
B. Effect of the anchors 
  The first treatment effect we discuss is that of the 1% anchor in the 2009 emails. Figure 4 
plots the average total contribution rate each pay period minus the total contribution rate the 
recipient had in effect on November 13, 2009, the last payday before the 2009 emails. The 
average contribution rate of the 1% anchor group and its control group all rise during the first 
two pay periods before beginning to fall, but the 1% anchor group’s average is persistently below 
                                                 
12 Karlan et al. (2011) and Cadena and Schoar (2011) find that reminders affect financial behaviors in developing 
country settings. Carroll et al. (2009) find no effect from a reminder in the U.S. One key difference may be that the 
Karlan et al. (2011) and Cadena and Schoar (2011) reminders were associated with a deadline, whereas the Carroll 
et al. (2009) reminder was not. The emails we analyze in this paper are thus closer to the reminders that have 
previously been found to be effective. 15 
the control group’s average until March 5, 2010, when the two converge as bonuses are paid. 
Surprisingly—given our prior expectation that anchoring effects would be strongest immediately 
after the email was sent—the gap between the 1% anchor group and the control group takes 
eleven weeks to reach its peak magnitude of 1.4% on February 5. The series diverge from each 
other after March 5, with the 1% anchor group again consistently contributing less than the 
control group through October 15 by as much as 1.2% of income.  
  Panel A of Table 3 shows tests of whether the 1% anchor and control group series in 
Figure 4 differ significantly from each other. We run a regression each pay period where the 
dependent  variable  is  the  recipient’s  total  contribution  rate  minus  the  recipient’s  total 
contribution rate on November 13, 2009 and the explanatory variable is a 1% anchor treatment 
dummy.
13 We find no significant treatment effect before year-end 2009, but from January 22 to 
February 19, 2010, the 1% anchor decreases average total contribution rates by between 1.1% 
and 1.4% of income at the 5% significance level or better. Of the sixteen post-bonus paydays in 
Table 3, the 1% anchor effect is significant at the 5% level on June 11 and June 25, and again on 
October 15—eleven months after the first email date. During these three dates, the 1% anchor 
decreases contribution rates by between 1.0% and 1.2% of income. The 1% anchor effect is also 
marginally significant at the 10% level on six other post-bonus paydays.  
We  can  examine  the  anchor  effect  integrated  over  periods  of  time  longer  than  one 
payday.
14 Using as the dependent variable each employee’s total contribution rate in excess of 
his November 13, 2009 total contribution rate averaged across paydays—including both paydays 
with and without significant treatment effects—the 1% anchor decreases contribution rates by 
0.8% of income (p = 0.047) during the seven paydays between November 27 and February 19, 
and decreases contribution rates by 0.8% of income (p = 0.076) during the sixteen paydays from 
March 19 to October 15. It also increases contribution rates by 0.05% (p = 0.933) of income on 
the March 5 bonus payday. Because we do not know how large each employee’s bonus was, we 
                                                 
13 This regression specification is equivalent to a two-period panel regression where the dependent variable is the 
total contribution rate and the explanatory variables are individual fixed effects and a treatment group dummy 
interacted  with  whether  the  observation  comes  after  the  email  date.  A  difference  in  differences  regression 
specification, which replaces the vector of individual fixed effects with a constant and a treatment group dummy, 
gives an identical treatment effect point estimate but has a larger standard error because it discards information from 
the data’s panel structure. 
14 The advantage of this approach relative to the individual payday regressions is that it concisely estimates the 
longer-run impact of the treatment. The disadvantage is that it reduces power to detect true effects whose duration is 
shorter than the period over which the averaging is done.  16 
do not know how each of these three averages should be weighted to construct the 1% anchor 
effect on total contributions as a percent of total compensation across all 24 paydays after the 
email was sent. 
The delayed reaction of the average contribution rate to the 1% anchor may be due to 
employees re-reading the email weeks after it had been sent in order to remind themselves of the 
instructions on how to change their contribution rate. The delayed reaction of the average is not 
caused  by  employees  who  react  to  the  email  with  greater  delay  being  more  susceptible  to 
anchors; the average contribution rate among employees who changed their contribution rate 
between the email send date and year-end 2009 also exhibits a growing divergence between the 
1%  anchor  and  control  groups  in  January,  an  attenuation  of  the  anchor  effect  on  the  bonus 
payday, and a re-emergence of the anchor effect after the bonus (not shown in exhibits). The fact 
that the 1% anchor had no significant effect on average contribution rates in 2009 does not mean 
it had no effect at all that year. A linear probability regression with the same controls as above 
(not shown in a table) reveals that 1% anchor recipients were 1.5 percentage points more likely 
(p = 0.035) to have a contribution rate exactly 1% of income higher than their November 13, 
2009 contribution rate during at least one pay period between November 27 and December 24, 
2009.  This  effect  represents  a  doubling  relative  to  the  control  group,  whose  corresponding 
probability is 1.6%. 
  Although  the  1%  anchor  results  in  lower  average  contribution  rate  increases,  does  it 
generate more equitable outcomes by encouraging a larger fraction of recipients to make small 
contribution rate increases? Panel B of Table 3 replaces the dependent variable in Panel A’s 
regressions with a dummy for a recipient’s total contribution rate during a given pay period 
being  different  from  her  November  13,  2009  total  contribution  rate.  In  other  words,  these 
regressions model the probability of any change, regardless of size. We find no strong evidence 
that the 1% anchor affected the probability of action. There is one payday, January 8, where the 
1% anchor has a positive 3.8 percentage point effect that is marginally significant at the 10% 
level. But when we instead use as the dependent variable a dummy for the total contribution rate 
being higher than the November 13 total contribution rate or a dummy for the total contribution 
rate being lower than the November 13 total contribution rate (not shown in tables), there is no 
marginally significant effect even on January 8. 
The second email campaign tested the effect of three higher anchors: the 3% anchor, the 17 
10% anchor, and the 20% anchor. Figure 5 shows the subsequent average total contribution rates 
in  excess  of  the  October  15,  2010  averages.  Up  through  the  March  11  bonus,  there  is  no 
consistent  relationship  among  the  average  contribution  rates  of  the  anchor  groups  and  the 
control. Panel A of Table 4, which contains regressions analogous to those in Panel A of Table 3, 
shows that none of the anchor treatment effects on average contribution rates is significant at the 
5% level during this time. We also cannot reject the equality of all the anchor treatment effects in 
every pay period before the bonus. Averaging across the ten pre-bonus paydays between October 
29 and March 4, the 3%, 10%, and 20% anchors decreased contribution rates by 0.2% of income 
(p = 0.451), 0.2% of income (p = 0.458), and 0.1% of income (p = 0.836), respectively. In 
untabulated regressions, we find that none of the anchors in the second email campaign increased 
the probability that the recipient’s contribution rate was exactly 3%, 10%, or 20% higher than 
her October 15, 2010 contribution rate in a subsequent pay period before year-end 2010. 
  But after the bonus, all three anchors became highly effective at raising contribution 
rates. The effects are statistically significant from March 18 to May 27, and their magnitudes are 
large: up to 1.5% of income for the 3% anchor, 1.9% of income for the 10% anchor, and 1.4% of 
income for the 20% anchor. However, we again cannot reject the three effects’ equality in any 
pay period. Averaging across the thirteen post-bonus paydays from March 18 to September 2, the 
3%, 10%, and 20% anchors increased contribution rates by 1.1% (p = 0.028), 1.1% (p = 0.031), 
and 1.0% (p = 0.019) of income, respectively. 
  The initial null effect of the higher anchors on average contribution rates may be tied to 
another effect the higher anchors had: unlike the 1% anchor, they caused recipients to disengage 
from their 401(k) in the short run. Panel B of Table 4 shows that the higher anchors decreased 
the probability of having a different contribution rate than one’s October 15 contribution rate in a 
given pay period by as much as 8 percentage points. The decreases are insignificant or only 
marginally significant at the 10% level through December 10, but achieve 5% significance or 
greater from December 23 to February 4 for one or more anchors before losing significance for 
the  remainder  of  the  sample  period.  Untabulated  regressions  reveal  that  the  higher  anchors 
decreased both the probability of having a higher contribution rate and the probability of having 
a lower contribution rate. These findings suggest a possible explanation for the timing of the high 
anchor effects. Initially, the high anchors may have had null effects on average contribution rates 
because they discouraged recipients who could not afford to increase their contribution rate by an 18 
amount close to the anchors, causing them to disengage from their 401(k). However, after the 
annual bonus, high anchor recipients may have had enough financial slack that they were no 
longer discouraged by their anchor, which resulted in their increasing their contribution rates. 
  The fact that the anchoring effect does not increase as the anchor rises above 3% is 
consistent with the experimental work of Quattrone et al. (1981) and Chapman and Johnson 
(1994), who find that extremely high anchors have effects that are similar to moderately high 
anchors. Such a result is predicted by the traditional explanation for anchoring effects: People 
begin their thought process at the anchor value and then adjust towards a more plausible value 
until they reach the nearest boundary of the plausible range (Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995). 
Therefore,  increasing  anchors  that  already  lie  outside  the  range  considered  plausible  by 
recipients will have no additional impact.  
 
C. Effect of savings goal examples 
  Figure 6A shows how average total contribution rates in excess of the October 15, 2010 
total contribution rate evolve following the dissemination of the $7,000 and $11,000 savings goal 
examples.  Through  March  4,  2011,  the  $11,000  goal  group  has  persistently  higher  average 
contribution rates than the control group, with the gap peaking at 2.2% of income at year-end 
2010. The ordering then reverses; the $11,000 goal group contributes less than the control group 
from March 18 to September 2. The $7,000 goal group oscillates above and below the control 
group, but is consistently below the $11,000 goal group before April 1 and above it afterwards. 
  Panel A of Table 5 contains the regression output analogue of Figure 6A. We see that the 
$11,000 goal treatment effect on the average contribution rate is increasing through year-end 
2010, achieving significance at the 5% level on December 23. The treatment effect remains 
marginally significant at the 10% level as late as February 4. Starting on April 1 through the end 
of the sample period, the treatment effect point estimate is negative but insignificant. The $7,000 
goal treatment effect is never significant at the 5% level. Averaging across paydays, the $11,000 
goal increases contribution rates by 1.1% of income (p = 0.043) from the email send date to the 
last pre-bonus payday, increases the bonus contribution by 0.1% of the bonus (p = 0.893), and 
decreases contribution rates by 0.2% of income (p = 0.621) from the first post-bonus payday to 
September 2. The $7,000 goal increases contributions by 0.02% of income (p = 0.971) before the 
bonus,  decreases  the  bonus  contribution  by  1.5%  of  the  bonus  (p  =  0.145),  and  increases 19 
contributions by 0.3% of income (p = 0.358) after the bonus. 
  Although the later negative point estimates of the $11,000 goal treatment effect might 
indicate that the $11,000 goal’s positive effect on contributions reverses in the long run, we show 
below that the reversal is probably an artifact of the annual dollar cap on before-tax plus Roth 
contributions. Because the $11,000 goal group contributed more early in 2011, they were more 
likely to hit the cap midway through the year, forcing their before-tax and Roth contribution rates 
to be zero for the remainder of 2011.
15  
We cannot identify precisely which employees were constrained by the cap because we 
have no information on the size of each employee’s 2011 bonus, so we do not know the dollars 
contributed  out  of  the  bonus  for  the  95%  of  employees  who  had  a  percentage  contribution 
election for their bonus. However, an employee who reduces his contribution rate to zero for the 
remainder of 2011 is likely to have done so because he hit the cap. We therefore construct an 
alternative contribution rate series that replaces any unbroken string of 0% total contribution 
rates that begins after the first payday of 2011 and ends on September 2, 2011 (the end of our 
sample period) with the last total contribution rate the employee had in effect before this string. 
The difference between this alternative series and the actual series shows how much of the drop 
in each group’s contribution rate is likely to be driven by the contribution cap. 
Figure 6B plots the resulting average contribution rates in excess of the October 15, 2010 
contribution rate. In this graph, the $11,000 goal group never contributes less than the control or 
$7,000 goal groups, suggesting that the reversal in Figure 6A is due to the contribution cap. 
Consistent with our assumption that permanent moves to a 0% contribution rate are due to the 
cap, the three contribution rate series in Figure 6B are indistinguishable from those in Figure 6A 
early in the year—when people are less likely to have hit the cap—and begin to deviate only 
after the March 11 bonus is paid. 
  Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) argue that goals very far from the status quo create a 
“starting problem,” where individuals find it difficult to motivate themselves to start a task. The 
linear  probability  regressions  in  Panel  B  of  Table  5  show  no  evidence  that  our  seemingly 
ambitious $11,000 goal generated a starting problem. The probability of having a contribution 
rate different than one’s October 15, 2010 contribution rate is between 1.5 and 5.9 percentage 
                                                 
15 They would still be able to contribute on an after-tax basis, but after-tax contributions are not matched and have a 
less favorable tax treatment. 20 
points higher among $11,000 goal recipients than control email recipients, depending on the pay 
period, although this difference is never significant at the 5% level. The $7,000 goal group is 
also  more  likely  to  act  than  the  control  group,  with  the  difference  in  probabilities  being 
significant at the 5% level on January 7, when the $7,000 goal group has a 9% higher probability 
of having a different contribution rate. There is no evidence that the probability of action is lower 
for the $11,000 goal group than for the $7,000 goal group. The absolute value of the t-statistic in 
a test of the difference between the two groups never exceeds the 1.39 (p = 0.165) it attains on 
December 23, when the $11,000 goal group is more likely to have acted than the $7,000 goal 
group. Therefore, unlike high anchors, goal examples raise contribution rates without decreasing 
engagement with the 401(k). 
 
D. Effect of $3,000 and $16,500 savings threshold salience 
  We begin our analysis of the effect of making the $3,000 and $16,500 savings thresholds 
salient by examining a histogram of total 2010 before-tax plus Roth contribution amounts by 
treatment group.
16 Figure 7 shows that those who received the $3,000 threshold treatment appear 
more likely than those who received the $16,500 threshold treatment to end up with 2010 before-
tax plus Roth contributions clustered around $3,000. Specifically, the $3,000 threshold treatment 
recipients were 5.0 percentage points more likely to end up with 2010 contributions between 
$2,700 and $2,999, 0.8 percentage points more likely to end up with 2010 contributions between 
$3,000 and $3,299, and 0.4 percentage points more likely to end up with 2010 contributions 
between $3,300 and $3,599. The 6.2 percentage point increase in the probability of having 2010 
contributions totaling between $2,700 and $3,599 is not statistically significant, however (p = 
0.113). 
  Despite there being hints that the $3,000 threshold treatment affected 2010 contributions 
relative  to  the  $16,500  threshold  treatment,  this  effect  does  not  appear  in  average  total 
contribution  rates.  Figure  8  shows  that  the  average  total  contribution  rates  in  excess  of  the 
October 15, 2010 total contribution rate of the two groups are quite similar through year-end 
2010. But a large gap opens up in 2011, as $3,000 threshold treatment recipients drop their 
contribution  rate  much  more  than  $16,500  threshold  treatment  recipients.  Seeing  the  lower 
                                                 
16  We  examine  before-tax  plus  Roth  contributions  instead  of  total  contributions  in  the  histogram  because  the 
thresholds in the treatments were linked to the match, which was only earned on before-tax and Roth contributions. 21 
threshold appears to have made recipients satisfied with achieving a lower savings level, causing 
them to contribute less afterwards. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the difference between the two 
groups’ average total contribution rates peaks at 1.5% of income on February 18, when it also 
achieves statistical significance at the 5% level. The difference is also marginally significant at 
the 10% level on January 21, March 4, and April 1 through May 13, and completely disappears 
by July 22. Averaging across the January 7 through July 8 non-bonus paydays, the $16,500 
threshold  group  on  average  contributed  1.0%  of  income  (p  =  0.045)  more  than  the  $3,000 
threshold group. The $16,500 threshold group also contributed 0.7% more of its bonus (p = 
0.359).  Panel  B  of  Table  6  indicates  that  the  threshold  highlights  did  not  have  significant 
differential effects on the probability of action. 
 
E. Effect of 60% contribution rate threshold salience 
  We analyze the effect of making the 60% contribution rate threshold salient separately 
for recipients who were on pace to contribute less than $2,500, between $2,500 and $4,999, and 
between  $5,000  and  $16,499  in  2009,  since  each  of  these  groups  faced  different  marginal 
matching incentives. 
Figure 9 plots over time the average total contribution rate in excess of the November 13, 
2009 total contribution rate. Recipients of the 60% threshold treatment who were projected to 
contribute less than $2,500 in 2009 immediately raise their contribution rate by 2.5% of income 
more than the control group, and this gap grows to 2.9% of income on December 24 before 
attenuating  to  less  than  1%  of  income  from  January  22  to  October  15.  Table  7  shows  the 
corresponding regression results through the March 5 bonus payday only for the sake of brevity. 
Panel A indicates that the treatment effects are statistically significant at the 5% level or better 
through  January  8,  2010  and  insignificant  afterwards.  Averaging  across  paydays,  the  60% 
threshold treatment increases contribution rates by 1.8% of income (p = 0.011) from the email 
send date to the last pre-bonus payday, 1.4% of income (p = 0.153) on the bonus payday, and 
0.4% of income (p = 0.615) after the bonus through October 15, 2010. 
On the other hand, the bottom two graphs in Figure 9 and Panels B and C of Table 7 
indicate that there is no significant 60% threshold treatment effect for recipients who were on 
pace to contribute at least $2,500 in 2009. 
In untabulated regressions, we examine whether the 60% highlight caused recipients to 22 
contribute exactly 60% of their income in any pay period between November 27, 2009 and 
October 15, 2010.
17 These regressions show that the 60% threshold treatment made contributing 
at 60% more likely only for recipients who were previously on pace to contribute less than 
$2,500 in 2009. The effect for these recipients is a 5.7 percentage point increase (p = 0.020) in 
the probability of contributing 60%, up from a baseline probability of 5.4% in the control group. 
The effect’s point estimate declines to an insignificant 1.1% (p = 0.411) for recipients on pace to 
contribute between $2,500 and $4,999 in 2009, and declines even further to an insignificant  
–1.0% (p = 0.461) effect for recipients on pace to contribute between $5,000 and $16,499 in 
2009. 
  Is the 60% threshold treatment effect on low contributors due to their learning from it that 
the plan’s maximum contribution rate is 60%? According to this explanation, employees in the 
control group chose smaller contribution increases than they otherwise would have because they 
falsely believed they were not allowed to contribute more. Table 8 presents evidence against this 
explanation. The coefficients are from a regression where the dependent variable is a dummy for 
having a higher total contribution rate than one had in effect on November 13, 2009, and the 
explanatory variable is a dummy for receiving the 60% threshold treatment.
18 The regressions in 
Panel A show that among low contributors, those who received a 60% highlight were between 
5.7 and 13.5 percentage points more likely to make an increase of any size between November 
27 and March 5, whereas the information story would predict that both groups would be equally 
likely to make a contribution increase (albeit of different sizes). These results also indicate that 
making salient the very high maximum possible contribution rate did not induce inertia due to 
demotivation among low savers.  
Panels B and C show that among those on pace to contribute more than $2,500, there is 
no effect of the 60% threshold treatment on the probability of increasing contributions, consistent 
with  the  previous  null  effects  within  these  projected  contribution  categories  on  average 
contribution rates and the probability of contributing exactly 60%. 
  Table  9  explores  further  a  theme  that  emerges  from  the  analysis  so  far:  The  60% 
threshold treatment has a larger effect on people contributing little at the time the email was sent. 
                                                 
17 The results are qualitatively similar if we only consider the period from November 27, 2009 to December 24, 
2009. 
18 Untabulated regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy for having a contribution rate that is either 
higher or lower than the November 13, 2009 value yield similar results. 23 
The  table  shows  that  low  contribution  rates,  not  low  contribution  dollar  amounts,  predict 
susceptibility to the 60% threshold treatment, even within the population on pace to contribute 
less than $2,500 in 2009. The dependent variable in the regressions, which are run separately for 
each  projected  contribution  category,  is  the  difference  between  that  pay  period’s  total 
contribution rate and the November 13, 2009 total contribution rate. The explanatory variables 
are a 60% threshold treatment dummy, a dummy for the November 13, 2009 total contribution 
rate being 0% or 1%, and an interaction between these two dummies.
19  
For those projected to contribute less than $2,500 (Panel A), the interaction is 3.9% and 
significant at the 5% level on November 27. In contrast, the coefficient on the uninteracted 
treatment dummy is only 1.0% and insignificant, indicating that almost all of the 60% threshold 
treatment effect in this contribution category is concentrated among employees with contribution 
rates of 0 to 1%. The interaction loses significance by the next payday and attenuates, but the 
point estimate remains sizable, never falling below 1.3%.  
Even though the 60% threshold treatment’s average effect on employees projected to 
contribute at least $2,500 was small and insignificant in Table 7, Panels B and C of Table 9 show 
that there is a strong positive treatment effect among employees in these projected contribution 
categories who were contributing 0 to 1% at the time of the email. The treatment interaction 
among  recipients  projected  to  contribute  $2,500  to  $4,999  is  significant  and  much  more 
persistent  than  the  interaction  among  those  projected  to  contribute  less  than  $2,500.  The 
interaction  starts  at  3.5%  but  grows  to  9.1%  by  January  8  and  remains  large  (≥  5.7%)  and 
significant through March 5. Adding the treatment and interaction coefficients together yields a 
treatment effect for 0 to 1% contributors in this projected contribution category of 3.2% to 8.9% 
of income. The treatment interaction pattern for recipients projected to contribute more than 
$5,000 lies between that of the first and second projected contribution categories; the interaction 
is large (6.3%) and significant on the first payday after the email, loses statistical significance 
immediately afterwards, but regains significance on January 22 and February 5 with large point 
estimates of between 6.0% and 6.6%. In that first payday, the treatment effect for 0 to 1% 
contributors is 6.1% of income. 
                                                 
19 We have chosen a dummy for the total November 13 contribution rate being 0% or 1% because in untabulated 
regressions of November 27 contribution rates minus November 13 contribution rates that control for dummies for 
each November 13 contribution rate from 0% to 5% and interactions of those dummies with the treatment effect, the 
0% and 1% interactions are large and the other interactions are small or negative.  24 
  Beshears et al. (2010b) present evidence that low-income employees are more strongly 
influenced by the default contribution rate in retirement savings plans. However, the strength of 
the 60% threshold treatment effect among 0 to 1% contributors does not seem to be explained by 
a general negative correlation between income and susceptibility to “nudges.” The average salary 
of those contributing 0 to 1% immediately prior to the email is 41% higher than that of those 
contributing at a higher rate among employees on pace to contribute less than $2,500, 61% 
higher  among  employees  on  pace  to  contribute  between  $2,500  and  $4,999,  and  7%  lower 
among employees on pace to contribute more than $5,000. 
  Our leading hypothesis is that employees with low contribution rates were particularly 
motivated by the 60% threshold cue because of the especially large gap between their current 
contribution  rate  and  the  threshold.  This  would  be  consistent  with  the  higher  contribution 
responses we find among employees who were randomly assigned to a more distant goal or a 
more distant dollar contribution threshold. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This  paper  makes  three  main  contributions.  First,  we  demonstrate  via  multiple 
independent large-scale field experiments that a variety of subtle numerical cues influence, in 
ways predicted by psychology and behavioral economics, decisions as economically significant 
and familiar as retirement savings plan contributions. Low cues decrease contribution rates by up 
to 1.4% of income, and high cues increase contribution rates by up to 2.9% of income. Cues have 
large  effects  even  when  the  surrounding  communication  explicitly  denies  that  the  cue  has 
informational content, implying that even incidental numbers contained in a communication can 
have large unintended consequences on subsequent choices. Second, we show that the impact of 
cues can be surprisingly long-lasting—in some conditions, for up to a year. To our knowledge, 
there  is  little  previous  research  on  the  time  course  of  cue  effects,  especially  outside  the 
laboratory. Finally, we document that reminders have substantial effects on savings choices, 
consistent with recent research on the importance of attention in economic decisions. 
In many ways this was an unlikely setting for these cues to wield much influence. The 
communication was the kind of administrative email many employees ignore. For those who did 
read it, the cues were only a very small part of an information-rich note. Finally, acting on the 
cue required multiple steps beyond reading the email (logging into the 401(k) administrator’s 25 
site, etc.). Finding an economically meaningful influence on decisions in this setting underscores 
the potential importance of these kinds of cues.  
Our  treatment  effects  are  estimated  on  a  particular  sample  of  employees  who  are 
generally well educated, technologically savvy, comfortable making changes in their 401(k), and 
on amicable terms with the company management. However, we believe that savings cues can be 
effective in populations that are quite different from our study company’s population. In a paper 
released after the first working paper draft of our own study, Goda, Manchester, and Sojourner 
(2011) describe a field experiment they ran using hard-copy mailings to University of Minnesota 
employees. Cues are not the main focus of their experiment; they are primarily interested in the 
effect  that  providing  projections  of  future  asset  balances  and  income  to  employees  has  on 
retirement  savings  plan  contributions.  But  they  did  randomly  vary  the  graphs  used  to 
communicate these projections. One set of graphs showed asset and income projections for the 
cases where the employees increased their savings by $0, $50, $100, or $250 per pay period. The 
other set of graphs showed these projections for the cases where the employees increased their 
savings by $0, $100, $200, or $500 per pay period. Employees receiving the graphs with the 
higher savings examples had a higher contribution rate six months after the mailing than that of 
those who received the graphs with the lower savings examples.
20 
Our findings provide both an opportunity and a warning for organizations and policy 
makers.  The  kinds  of  cues  we  investigate  could  be  used  intentionally  to  influence  saving 
behavior more efficiently than more costly interventions, such as financial education or higher 
matches. But unintentional cues, even those buried in mundane communications, can also affect 
behavior. Organizations and policymakers should wield them mindfully. 
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This table lists the text that was inserted into the emails in each cue treatment at the point 
indicated in Figure 1. 
 
Cue type  Treatment  Additional email text 
Anchor  1% anchor  For example, you could increase your contribution rate by 1% of 
your income and get more of the match money for which you’re 
eligible. (1% is just an example, and shouldn’t be interpreted as 
advice on what the right contribution increase is for you.) 
  3% anchor  For example, you could increase your contribution rate by 3% of 
your income and get more of the match money for which you’re 
eligible. (3% is just an example, and shouldn’t be interpreted as 
advice on what the right contribution increase is for you.) 
  10% anchor  For example, you could increase your contribution rate by 10% of 
your income and get more of the match money for which you’re 
eligible. (10% is just an example, and shouldn’t be interpreted as 
advice on what the right contribution increase is for you.) 
  20% anchor  For example, you could increase your contribution rate by 20% of 
your income and get more of the match money for which you’re 
eligible. (20% is just an example, and shouldn’t be interpreted as 
advice on what the right contribution increase is for you.) 
Savings 
goal 
$7,000 goal  For example, suppose you set a goal to contribute $7,000 for the 
year and you attained it. You would earn $500 more in matching 
money this year than you’re currently on pace for. 
  $11,000 goal  For example, suppose you set a goal to contribute $11,000 for the 
year and you attained it. You would earn $2,500 more in matching 





The next $x of contributions you make between now and December 
31 will be matched at a 100% rate. 
[x is the difference between $3,000 and the recipient’s year-to-date 
match-eligible contributions] 
  $16,500 
threshold 
Contributing $y more between now and December 31 would earn 
you the maximum possible match. 
[y is the difference between $16,500 and the recipient’s year-to-
date match-eligible contributions] 
  60% 
threshold 
You can contribute up to 60% of your income in any pay period. 
 
  Table 2. Subjects per experimental cell 
This table shows the number of employees who received each version of the 401(k) email in 
2009 and 2010. The numbers are reported separately by projected contribution category. 
Projected contributions are the total before-tax plus Roth contributions to the 401(k) an 
employee would have ended up with in 2009 or 2010 if the contribution rates effective 
immediately prior to email receipt remained unchanged for the remainder of the calendar year. 
 
Panel A: 2009 email campaign 
  Projected 2009 before-tax + Roth contributions 
  $0 - $2,499  $2,500 - $4,999  $5,000 - $16,499 
Control  257 651 973 
1% anchor  0  0  968 
60%  threshold  252 651 971 
Panel B: 2010 email campaign 
  Projected 2010 before-tax + Roth contributions 
  $0 - $2,999  $3,000 - $5,999  $6,000 - $16,499 
Control 0  263  560 
Delayed control  0  260  560 
3% anchor  0  0  561 
10% anchor  0  0  562 
20% anchor  0  0  565 
$7,000 savings goal  0  263  0 
$11,000 savings goal  0  262  0 
$3,000 threshold  226  0  0 
$16,500 threshold  225  0  0 
  
    Table 3. Effect of 1% anchor in 2009 emails   
Within each panel, a separate regression is run for each column. The sample is employees who were on pace to contribute at least 
$5,000 in before-tax plus Roth contributions in 2009 if they left the contribution rates in effect on November 4, 2009 unchanged for 
the remainder of 2009. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the difference between the total (before-tax plus after-tax plus Roth) 
401(k) contribution rate effective on the column’s payday and the total contribution rate effective on November 13, 2009. In Panel B, 
the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the total contribution rate on the column’s payday differs from the total contribution 
rate on November 13, 2009. The control variable is a dummy for whether the employee received the 1% anchor. Standard errors are in 
parentheses below the point estimates. 
+ Significant at the 10% level. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Contribution rate relative to 11/13/2009 contribution rate 
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10  3/19/10  4/2/10  4/16/10  4/30/10 
1% anchor  -0.572 -0.173 -0.322 -0.960
+  -1.304** -1.393** -1.103*  0.055 -0.486 -0.750 -0.724 -0.782 
  (0.450) (0.559) (0.611) (0.574) (0.504) (0.492) (0.508) (0.656) (0.498) (0.499) (0.484) (0.487) 
Constant  2.996** 3.960** 3.310** 4.419** 2.621** 2.209** 1.809** 1.937**  -0.657
+ -0.356 -0.379 -0.577
+
  (0.318) (0.395) (0.432) (0.406) (0.357) (0.348) (0.360) (0.464) (0.353) (0.353) (0.342) (0.344) 
  5/14/10  5/28/10  6/11/10  6/25/10  7/9/10  7/23/10  8/6/10  8/20/10  9/3/10  9/17/10  10/1/10  10/15/10 
1% anchor  -0.906
+ -0.953
+  -1.186* -1.024* -0.922
+ -0.957
+  -0.756 -0.695 -0.613 -0.885
+ -1.035
+ -1.146* 
  (0.490) (0.488) (0.490) (0.499) (0.491) (0.496) (0.511) (0.518) (0.518) (0.529) (0.544) (0.547) 
Constant  -0.702* -0.660
+  -0.903** -1.091** -1.426** -1.564** -1.987** -2.172** -2.569** -2.693** -2.698** -2.828** 
  (0.346) (0.346) (0.347) (0.354) (0.348) (0.351) (0.362) (0.366) (0.367) (0.374) (0.384) (0.387) 
Panel B: Probability of contribution rate different than 11/13/2009 contribution rate 
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10  3/19/10  4/2/10  4/16/10  4/30/10 
1%  anchor  0.012 0.018 0.017 0.038
+  0.031 0.036 0.032 0.002 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.020 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant  0.159** 0.248** 0.284** 0.590** 0.695** 0.610** 0.624** 0.713** 0.684** 0.684** 0.684** 0.691** 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
  5/14/10  5/28/10  6/11/10  6/25/10  7/9/10  7/23/10  8/6/10  8/20/10  9/3/10  9/17/10  10/1/10  10/15/10 
1%  anchor  0.025 0.021 0.019 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.007 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant  0.690** 0.692** 0.697** 0.703** 0.710** 0.714** 0.722** 0.726** 0.730** 0.738** 0.742** 0.748** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
  Table 4. Effect of 3%, 10%, and 20% anchors in 2010 emails 
Within each panel, a separate regression is run for each column. The sample is employees who were not assigned to the delayed control group and 
were on pace to contribute at least $6,000 in before-tax plus Roth contributions in 2010 if they left the contribution rates in effect on October 15, 
2010 unchanged for the remainder of 2010. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the difference between the total (before-tax plus after-tax plus 
Roth) 401(k) contribution rate effective on the column’s payday and the total contribution rate effective on October 15, 2010. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the total contribution rate on the column’s payday differs from the total contribution rate on October 
15, 2010. The columns labeled “Bonus” use the contribution rate elections in effect for the annual bonus to construct the dependent variable. The 
control variables are dummies for whether the employee received the 3% anchor, 10% anchor, or 20% anchor. Standard errors are in parentheses 
below the point estimates.
 + Significant at the 10% level. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
Panel A: Contribution rate relative to 10/15/2010 contribution rate 
  10/29/10  11/12/10  11/26/10  12/10/10  12/23/10  1/7/11  1/21/11  2/4/11  2/18/11  3/4/11  Bonus  3/18/11 
3% anchor  -0.710
+  -0.682 -0.630 -0.292 -0.713 -0.320 -0.080  -0.092 0.347 0.718 0.466 0.979
+
  (0.420) (0.545) (0.646) (0.642) (0.656) (0.625) (0.554) (0.521) (0.588) (0.536) (0.861) (0.512) 
10%  anchor  -0.580 -0.453 -0.199  0.005 -0.775 -0.820  -0.335  -0.407 0.303 0.574 0.693 1.174* 
  (0.420) (0.545) (0.645) (0.641) (0.656) (0.625) (0.554) (0.521) (0.588) (0.536) (0.862) (0.513) 
20%  anchor  -0.433 -0.305 -0.189  0.156 0.133 0.001  -0.031  -0.312  -0.207 0.168 0.553 0.732
  (0.419) (0.544) (0.644) (0.640) (0.654) (0.624) (0.552) (0.519) (0.586) (0.534) (0.862) (0.512) 
Constant  2.082** 3.036** 3.673** 3.060** 2.913** 3.461** 2.292** 2.049** 1.095** 0.732
+ 1.479* 0.063 
  (0.297) (0.386) (0.457) (0.454) (0.464) (0.442) (0.392) (0.368) (0.416) (0.379) (0.610) (0.363) 
  4/1/11  4/15/11  4/29/11  5/13/11  5/27/11  6/10/11  6/24/11  7/8/11  7/22/11  8/5/11  8/19/11  9/2/11 
3%  anchor  1.549** 1.549** 1.455** 1.531** 1.231** 0.921
+ 0.850
+  0.852 0.722 0.767 0.772 0.669
  (0.486) (0.491) (0.474) (0.483) (0.476) (0.486) (0.511) (0.522) (0.499) (0.495) (0.521) (0.534) 
10%  anchor  1.712** 1.867** 1.542** 1.517** 1.130*  0.719 0.495 0.326 0.225 0.400 0.687 0.577 
  (0.487) (0.492) (0.476) (0.484) (0.476) (0.487) (0.512) (0.522) (0.499) (0.496) (0.522) (0.535) 
20%  anchor  1.206*  1.420** 1.342** 1.340** 1.114*  0.914
+ 0.862
+  0.850 0.918
+ 0.915
+ 0.851 0.618 
  (0.486) (0.491) (0.475) (0.483) (0.476) (0.486) (0.512) (0.522) (0.499) (0.495) (0.521) (0.534) 
Constant  -1.302** -1.502** -1.594** -1.588** -1.691** -1.615** -1.708** -1.808** -2.035** -2.132** -2.335** -2.610** 
  (0.344) (0.348) (0.336) (0.342) (0.337) (0.344) (0.362) (0.369) (0.353) (0.350) (0.369) (0.379) 
  Panel B: Probability of contribution rate different than rate effective 10/15/2010 
  10/29/10  11/12/10  11/26/10  12/10/10  12/23/10  1/7/11  1/21/11  2/4/11  2/18/11  3/4/11  Bonus  3/18/11 
3% anchor  -0.032
+ -0.038
  -0.036 -0.049
+ -0.064* -0.068* -0.062* -0.044  -0.023  -0.021 -0.012 -0.016 
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
10%  anchor  -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.030 -0.053
+ -0.079** -0.063*  -0.059
+ -0.043 -0.043 -0.033 -0.036 
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 




+ -0.059* -0.076* -0.072* -0.072* -0.044 -0.042 -0.036 -0.040 
  (0.019) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Constant  0.143** 0.217** 0.264** 0.292** 0.325** 0.530** 0.551** 0.557** 0.580** 0.580** 0.594** 0.584** 
  (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
  4/1/11  4/15/11  4/29/11  5/13/11  5/27/11  6/10/11  6/24/11  7/8/11  7/22/11  8/5/11  8/19/11  9/2/11 
3%  anchor -0.022 -0.015 -0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.018 -0.016 -0.019 -0.020 -0.025 -0.016 -0.009 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
10%  anchor  -0.032 -0.042 -0.039 -0.045 -0.044 -0.046 -0.037 -0.041 -0.036 -0.029 -0.022 -0.015 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
20% anchor  -0.044  -0.047
  -0.041 -0.045 -0.048 -0.050
+ -0.049
  -0.048 -0.042 -0.039 -0.032 -0.026 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Constant  0.600** 0.604** 0.606** 0.613** 0.617** 0.618** 0.619** 0.625** 0.626** 0.627** 0.625** 0.628** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
  Table 5. Effect of goal examples in 2010 emails 
Within each panel, a separate regression is run for each column. The sample is employees who were not assigned to the delayed 
control group and were on pace to contribute between $3,000 and $5,999 in before-tax plus Roth contributions in 2010 if they left the 
contribution rates in effect on October 15, 2010 unchanged for the remainder of 2010. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the 
difference between the total (before-tax plus after-tax plus Roth) 401(k) contribution rate effective on the column’s payday and the 
total contribution rate effective on October 15, 2010. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the total contribution 
rate on the column’s payday differs from the total contribution rate on October 15, 2010. The columns labeled “Bonus” use the 
contribution rate elections in effect for the annual bonus to construct the dependent variable. The control variables are dummies for 
whether the employee received the $7,000 savings goal example or the $11,000 savings goal example. Standard errors are in 
parentheses below the point estimates.
 + Significant at the 10% level. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Contribution rate relative to 10/15/2010 contribution rate 
  10/29/10  11/12/10  11/26/10  12/10/10  12/23/10  1/7/11  1/21/11  2/4/11  2/18/11  3/4/11  Bonus  3/18/11 
$7,000  goal  -0.437 0.783 0.761 0.699 0.100 0.046 -0.403 -0.194 -0.624 -0.671 -1.482 -0.654 
  (0.476) (0.656) (0.876) (0.953) (0.932) (0.775) (0.647) (0.604) (0.711) (0.711) (1.017) (0.680) 
$11,000  goal  0.678 0.835 1.505
+ 1.762
+ 2.234* 1.388
+ 0.570  1.102
+  0.560 0.536 0.137 0.038 
  (0.477) (0.656) (0.878) (0.956) (0.935) (0.777) (0.649) (0.606) (0.712) (0.712) (1.021) (0.682) 
Constant 0.608
+  0.726  1.414*  1.736*  1.704** 1.784** 1.996** 1.709** 1.808** 1.831** 2.736** 1.935** 
  (0.337) (0.464) (0.620) (0.674) (0.659) (0.548) (0.457) (0.427) (0.502) (0.502) (0.717) (0.481) 
  4/1/11  4/15/11  4/29/11  5/13/11  5/27/11  6/10/11  6/24/11  7/8/11  7/22/11  8/5/11  8/19/11  9/2/11 
$7,000  goal  -0.135  -0.178 0.008 0.139 0.758
+ 0.658 0.460 0.274 0.221 0.250  -0.015 0.010 
  (0.592) (0.579) (0.612) (0.617) (0.308) (0.430) (0.361) (0.363) (0.364) (0.371) (0.392) (0.392) 
$11,000  goal  -0.358 -0.589 -0.720 -0.637 -0.002 -0.090 -0.249 -0.333 -0.393 -0.159 -0.360 -0.287 
  (0.595) (0.582) (0.615) (0.619) (0.437) (0.431) (0.612) (0.364) (0.365) (0.371) (0.393) (0.393) 
Constant  1.500** 1.600** 1.675** 1.563** 0.738*  0.733*  0.662** 0.748** 0.780** 0.638*  0.564*  0.495
+
  (0.419) (0.409) (0.432) (0.435) (0.308) (0.304) (0.255) (0.257) (0.257) (0.262) (0.278) (0.279) 
  Panel B: Probability of contribution rate different than rate effective 10/15/2010 
  10/29/10  11/12/10  11/26/10  12/10/10  12/23/10  1/7/11  1/21/11  2/4/11  2/18/11  3/4/11  Bonus  3/18/11 




  (0.020) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) 
$11,000  goal  0.015 0.019 0.035 0.041 0.057
+  0.059 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.031 0.037 0.022 
  (0.020) (0.025) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) 
Constant  0.046** 0.076** 0.107** 0.130** 0.142** 0.347** 0.403** 0.415** 0.469** 0.473** 0.488** 0.492** 
  (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
  4/1/11  4/15/11  4/29/11  5/13/11  5/27/11  6/10/11  6/24/11  7/8/11  7/22/11  8/5/11  8/19/11  9/2/11 
$7,000  goal  0.047 0.038 0.044 0.050 0.046 0.052 0.049 0.039 0.035 0.045 0.038 0.048 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
$11,000  goal  0.022 0.024 0.035 0.041 0.033 0.041 0.037 0.029 0.033 0.037 0.029 0.024 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Constant  0.498** 0.504** 0.508** 0.502** 0.510** 0.508** 0.516** 0.528** 0.534** 0.529** 0.539** 0.540** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
  Table 6. Effect of highlighting $3,000 and $16,500 thresholds in 2010 emails 
Within each panel, a separate regression is run for each column. The sample is employees who were on pace to contribute less than 
$3,000 in before-tax plus Roth contributions in 2010 if they left the contribution rates in effect on October 15, 2010 unchanged for the 
remainder of 2010. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the difference between the total (before-tax plus after-tax plus Roth) 401(k) 
contribution rate effective on the column’s payday and the total contribution rate effective on October 15, 2010. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the total contribution rate on the column’s payday differs from the total contribution rate 
on October 15, 2010. The columns labeled “Bonus” use the contribution rate elections in effect for the annual bonus to construct the 
dependent variable. The control variable is a dummy for whether the employee received the $16,500 contribution threshold treatment. 
Standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates.
 +  Significant at the 10% level. * Significant at the 5% level.   
** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Contribution rate relative to 10/15/2010 contribution rate 
  10/29/10  11/12/10  11/26/10  12/10/10  12/23/10  1/7/11  1/21/11  2/4/11  2/18/11  3/4/11  Bonus  3/18/11 
$16,500  0.218 0.231 0.106 0.223 0.031 0.312 1.440
+ 1.070  1.536* 1.041
+ 0.690 0.841 
threshold  (0.686) (1.005) (1.199) (1.297) (1.274) (1.052) (0.793) (0.698) (0.755) (0.600) (0.752) (0.545) 
Constant  1.066*  2.597** 3.658** 4.209** 4.280** 3.284** 1.665** 1.815** 1.480** 1.386** 1.511** 1.330** 
  (0.484) (0.707) (0.843) (0.912) (0.895) (0.738) (0.557) (0.490) (0.527) (0.420) (0.524) (0.382) 





+ 0.499 0.501 0.447 0.257  -0.002  -0.357 0.104 0.212 
threshold  (0.702) (0.710) (0.669) (0.669) (0.441) (0.451) (0.453) (0.472) (0.643) (0.617) (0.435) (0.440) 
Constant  1.270** 1.284*  1.201*  1.220** 1.010** 1.079** 1.119** 1.302** 1.614** 1.762** 1.185** 0.990** 
  (0.493) (0.498) (0.469) (0.469) (0.309) (0.317) (0.319) (0.330) (0.450) (0.433) (0.306) (0.310) 
Panel B: Probability of contribution rate different than rate effective 10/15/2010 
  10/29/10  11/12/10  11/26/10  12/10/10  12/23/10  1/7/11  1/21/11  2/4/11  2/18/11  3/4/11  Bonus  3/18/11 
$16,500  -0.004 -0.005 -0.036 -0.053 -0.052 -0.060 -0.048 -0.066 -0.024 -0.021 -0.024 -0.025 
threshold  (0.028) (0.035) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Constant  0.102** 0.164** 0.222** 0.258** 0.265** 0.404** 0.411** 0.438** 0.453** 0.450** 0.433** 0.468** 
  (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
  4/1/11  4/15/11  4/29/11  5/13/11  5/27/11  6/10/11  6/24/11  7/8/11  7/22/11  8/5/11  8/19/11  9/2/11 
$16,500  -0.033 -0.022 -0.011 -0.020 -0.031 -0.017 -0.012 -0.009 -0.005  0.012  0.005  0.005 
threshold  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Constant  0.486** 0.477** 0.472** 0.477** 0.493** 0.493** 0.502** 0.512** 0.507** 0.509** 0.512** 0.517** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) Table 7. Effect of 60% contribution rate threshold treatment in 2009 emails on average contribution rate change 
Each panel contains a different sample of employees, divided according to how much they would contribute on a before-tax plus Roth 
basis to the 401(k) in 2009 if they left the contribution rates in effect on November 13, 2009 unchanged for the remainder of 2009. We 
exclude employees assigned to the 1% anchor. Within each panel, a separate regression is run for each column. The dependent 
variable is the difference between the total (before-tax plus after-tax plus Roth) 401(k) contribution rate effective on the column’s 
payday and the total contribution rate effective on November 13, 2009. The control variable is a dummy for whether the employee 
received the 60% contribution rate threshold treatment. Standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates.
 + Significant at 
the 10% level. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: $0 - $2,499 projected 2009 contributions  
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60%  threshold 2.484**  2.749**  2.867*  2.536*  0.563 0.812 0.648 1.353 
  (0.877) (1.010) (1.160) (1.058) (0.811) (0.728) (0.731) (0.946) 
Constant  1.004 1.763*  2.512**  2.424**  1.437*  0.680 0.779 0.631 
  (0.617) (0.710) (0.816) (0.743) (0.569) (0.511) (0.513) (0.665) 
Panel B: $2,500 - $4,999 projected 2009 contributions 
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60%  threshold  -0.084  -0.288  -0.093 0.252 0.565 0.186 0.237 0.696 
  (0.408) (0.511) (0.524) (0.445) (0.383) (0.355) (0.344) (0.578) 
Constant  1.363** 2.278** 2.295** 2.289** 1.805** 1.934** 1.814** 2.344** 
  (0.288) (0.361) (0.371) (0.316) (0.271) (0.251) (0.244) (0.409) 
Panel C: $5,000 - $16,499 projected 2009 contributions 
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60% threshold  -0.075  0.378  0.285  -0.322 -0.097 -0.272 -0.163 -0.698 
  (0.476) (0.569) (0.607) (0.564) (0.491) (0.470) (0.460) (0.593) 
Constant  2.996** 3.960** 3.310** 4.419** 2.621** 2.209** 1.809** 1.937** 
  (0.336) (0.402) (0.430) (0.400) (0.348) (0.333) (0.326) (0.420) 
  Table 8. Effect of 60% contribution rate threshold treatment in 2009 emails on probability of a contribution rate increase 
Each panel contains a different sample of employees, divided according to how many dollars they would contribute on a before-tax 
plus Roth basis to the 401(k) in 2009 if they left the contribution rates in effect on November 13, 2009 unchanged for the remainder of 
2009. We exclude employees assigned to the 1% anchor. Within each panel, a separate regression is run for each column. The 
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the total contribution rate on the column’s payday is higher than the total contribution rate 
on November 13, 2009. The control variable is a dummy for whether the employee received the 60% contribution rate threshold 
treatment. Standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates.
 + Significant at the 10% level. * Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: $0 - $2,499 projected 2009 contributions  
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60%  threshold  0.057*  0.066*  0.071*  0.115** 0.123** 0.123** 0.119** 0.135** 
  (0.027) (0.033) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Constant  0.078** 0.128** 0.164** 0.490** 0.476** 0.470** 0.470** 0.377** 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Panel B: $2,500 - $4,999 projected 2009 contributions 
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60% threshold  -0.003  -0.009  -0.009 -0.032 -0.033 -0.034 -0.044 -0.006 
  (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Constant  0.081** 0.135** 0.156** 0.688** 0.686** 0.693** 0.697** 0.621** 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Panel C: $5,000 - $16,499 projected 2009 contributions 
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60%  threshold 0.002 0.014 0.015 0.033 0.022 0.018 0.012  -0.002 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Constant  0.159** 0.248** 0.284** 0.590** 0.605** 0.610** 0.624** 0.713** 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
 Table 9. Interaction of pre-email contribution rate with  
60% contribution rate threshold treatment effect on subsequent contribution rate change 
Each panel contains a different sample of employees, divided according to how many dollars they would contribute to the 401(k) in 
2009 if they left the contribution rates in effect on November 13, 2009 unchanged for the remainder of 2009. We exclude employees 
assigned to the 1% anchor. Within each panel, a separate regression is run for each column. The dependent variable is the difference 
between the total (before-tax plus after-tax plus Roth) 401(k) contribution rate effective on the column’s payday and the total 
contribution rate effective on November 13, 2009. The control variables are dummies for whether the employee received the 60% 
contribution rate threshold treatment and whether her total contribution rate on November 13, 2009 was 0% or 1%, and the interaction 
of these two dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates.
 + Significant at the 10% level. * Significant at the 
5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: $0 - $2,499 projected 2009 contributions  
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60%  threshold 0.956 1.400 1.715 1.523 0.127 0.420 0.312 0.821 
  (1.172) (1.344) (1.541) (1.408) (1.080) (0.972) (0.975) (1.267) 
60% threshold ×  3.929*  3.748
+ 3.460 3.099 1.577 1.390 1.300 1.843 
0-1% rate  (1.747)  (2.003)  (2.297)  (2.106) (1.615) (1.451) (1.455) (1.888) 




  (1.219) (1.397) (1.603) (1.464) (1.124) (1.010) (1.012) (1.315) 
Constant  0.554 0.708 0.900 1.140 0.295  -0.297  -0.305  -0.575 
  (0.857) (0.982) (1.125) (1.029) (0.788) (0.710) (0.712) (0.926) 
Panel B: $2,500 - $4,999 projected 2009 contributions 
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60%  threshold -0.275 -0.568 -0.371 -0.178  0.151 -0.163 -0.046  0.354 
  (0.415) (0.520) (0.533) (0.450) (0.384) (0.357) (0.348) (0.587) 
60% threshold ×  3.519
+  5.656*  5.615*  9.083** 8.320** 7.032** 5.665** 6.840* 
0-1% rate  (2.099)  (2.630)  (2.694)  (2.263) (1.931) (1.819) (1.770) (2.988) 
0-1%  rate  1.052 -0.568  0.089 -1.234  0.005 -0.087  0.037  0.057 
  (1.626) (0.520) (2.086) (1.752) (1.495) (1.422) (1.384) (2.335) 
Constant  1.329** 2.275** 2.292** 2.330** 1.805** 1.937** 1.813** 2.343** 
  (0.292) (0.366) (0.376) (0.317) (0.271) (0.252) (0.245) (0.414) 
  Panel C: $5,000 - $16,499 projected 2009 contributions 
  11/27/09  12/11/09  12/24/09  1/8/10  1/22/10  2/5/10  2/19/10  3/5/10 
60% threshold  -0.167  0.340  0.204  -0.304 -0.177 -0.304 -0.103 -0.494 
  (0.476) (0.574) (0.614) (0.568) (0.489) (0.465) (0.453) (0.587) 
60% threshold ×  6.305*  3.386  4.984  2.024  6.624*  5.959*  2.724  -2.283 
0-1% rate  (2.968)  (3.575)  (3.816)  (3.526) (3.029) (2.917) (2.841) (3.684) 
0-1% rate  7.077**  5.338* 4.267
+ 8.528**  9.352** 11.484** 13.995** 18.200** 
  (1.953) (2.353) (2.512) (2.321) (1.994) (1.896) (1.846) (2.394) 
Constant  2.785** 3.800** 3.182** 4.162** 2.337** 1.861** 1.385** 1.386** 
  (0.337) (0.407) (0.435) (0.403) (0.347) (0.330) (0.321) (0.417) 




We want to remind you that [Company] matches your qualified contributions (pre-tax 
and Roth) to the [Company] 401(k) Plan. In other words, [Company] will give you free 
money for saving in your 401(k). 
 
What is the [Company] match?  
[Company]’s matching contribution is the greater of: (a) 100% of your qualified 2009 
401(k) contributions up to $2,500; or (b) 50% of your qualified 2009 contributions up to 
$16,500 for a total possible match of $8,250.* 
 
Where am I at right now?  
You’ve made $X,XXX in qualified payroll contributions to the [Company] 401(k) Plan 
as of November 1, 2009. 
 
To take greater advantage of [Company]’s 2009 match, increase your contribution rate 
for the remaining six weeks of 2009. Treatment text was inserted here. 
 
See this calendar for deadlines for making contribution changes. ** 
 
How do I increase my contribution?  
To change your contribution rate, follow these steps: 
1. Log in to Vanguard, our 401(k) vendor. (If you've never logged in before, you will 
need the [Company] Plan number, [######].)  
 
2. Click on "Change paycheck deductions" under the "I want to. . ." menu 
 
3. Adjust your percentages in the boxes.  
 
4. Click "continue" and follow directions until you see the confirmation page. A 
confirmation will also be emailed or mailed to you. 
 
Happy saving! 
- [Director of Benefits] 
 
* Must be employed at last day of the plan year in order to receive the maximum match. 
See URL for more details. 
 
** The actual amount you can contribute is subject to other IRS limits. See Plan Specific 
Limitations for details. 
  Figure 2. Average total contribution rate among November 2009 control email 





Figure 3. Average total contribution rate in excess of October 15, 2010 total 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































before email  
First contribution  
affected by delayed email 
Auto-escalation  
Auto-escalation  
Bonus paid  
Bonus paid  Figure 4. Average total contribution rate in excess of November 13, 2009 total contribution 






Figure 5. Average total contribution rate in excess of October 15, 2010 total contribution 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Control 3% anchor 10% anchor 20% anchorFigure 6A. Average total contribution rate in excess of October 15, 2010 total contribution 
rate, email recipients projected to contribute $3,000 to $5,999 in 2010 
 
Figure 6B. Adjusted average total contribution rate in excess of October 15, 2010 total 
contribution rate, email recipients projected to contribute $3,000 to $5,999 in 2010 
Any contiguous sequence of 0% contribution rates that begins after January 7, 2011 and ends on 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Control $7,000 goal $11,000 goal 
Figure 7. Histogram of total before-tax plus Roth 2010 contributions,  
email recipients projected to contribute less than $3,000 in 2010 
 
Figure 8. Average total contribution rate in excess of October 15, 2010 total contribution 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































$3,000 threshold $16,500 threshold 
Figure 9. Average total contribution rate in excess of  









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Projected 2009 contributions: $5,000 - $16,499
Control 60% threshold